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ABSTRACT 
 
Both China‘s political and constitutional systems demand a compliant and subservient 
judiciary. Politically, the court is a marginal institution in China‘s political system and 
the Party controls the judiciary effectively through the Political-Legal Committee. But 
political control and a resulting judicial compliance and subservience are not the only 
story of the past 30 years in China. The political and economic changes in China have 
generated demands for the rule of law to supply political legitimacy, promote 
economic development and improve social governance. Within the Party, there has 
been a reformist tradition which advocates a functional separation between the Party 
and the legal institutions, an enhanced role of law and an expansive institutional 
autonomy of the courts. The relationship between the Party and the court is thus a 
dynamic one. While the Party has the absolute power, it has to refrain itself from 
intruding into the daily operation of the court and leave judges alone to handle the 
business of judging. The Party has its own objectives and repeatedly reminds the court 
of keeping the Party‘s interest the priority in adjudication, but judges have to follow 
legal rules, procedures and their own professional standard in handling individual 
cases. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Building judicial autonomy in China‘s authoritarian state is an ironic exercise. On the 
one hand, the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter ―the CCP‖) welds the supreme and 
overriding power and does not allow an autonomous judiciary. On the other, the CCP 
has made efforts to develop a limited rule of law and to build a professional court 
system which may ultimately regulate and limit the exercise of the CCP‘s unfettered 
power.  
 
The Party, taking over the state power through many years‘ bloody armed rebellion, is 
the leading political party in China and its leadership position is entrenched in the 
Constitution of the State. According to the Preamble of the Constitution, the CCP has 
led the Chinese people to victory and will continue to lead the people in building a 
socialist China. The CCP‘s power is plenary and ubiquitous with the potential to reach 
every institution and fabric of the society (Zhu 2008). It is the supreme authority in 
the country to which the court, like any other institutions, is ultimately accountable. 
This political supremacy of the CCP allows it to tramp law (Zhu 2008: 541). While 
the CCP may interact with law in multiple ways, there is no doubt that it is the soul of 
China‘s living Constitution (He 2012).  
 
But the Constitution also places certain qualifications on the political power of the 
CCP over the court. First, Article 126 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he people‘s 
courts exercise judicial power independently, in accordance with the provisions of the 
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law, and are not subject to interference by any administrative organ, public 
organization or individual.‖ Article 5 of the Constitution creates a more general 
constraint on the political power of the CCP by creating a rule of law state and 
declaring that ―[n]o organization or individual is privileged to be beyond the 
Constitution or the law.‖ The CCP, in its Constitution (黨章), has also accepted the 
supremacy of the state constitution and the inviolability of state laws (Chen 2011). 
The vexing question is, to what extent can independent adjudication of cases by courts 
be reconciled with the leadership of the CCP? This chapter studies the nature and 
operation of the political power in the broadly-defined political-legal sector and the 
potential of the courts to develop a degree of autonomy within the authoritarian 
political system.  
 
CCP LEADERSHIHP AND THE POLITICAL-LEGAL COMMITTEE  
 
CCP leadership is a foundational rule in the Chinese polity. The CCP claims to be the 
sole representative of the people and the CCP‘s interest identifies with that of the 
people (Nathan 1985). Although the CCP recognizes a degree of social and economic 
pluralism in the reform era and allows different social groups to articulate and assert 
their interests, the foundational rule has not changed in the past 30 years. The CCP 
may be adaptive to changes and innovative in governance strategies, but it is beyond 
doubt that CCP leads and CCP‘s interests are supreme (Shambaugh 2008).   
 
For the CCP, law is subsidiary and subservient, and does not form a separate system 
(xitong, 系统). It does not have a necessary epistemological and institutional 
autonomy, and is merely part of a much broader political-legal system (政法系统). 
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The political-legal system has variously been defined as ―the civilian coercive 
apparatus‖ (Lieberthal 1995: 199; Saich 2004) which is controlled by ―the powerful, 
often brutal men who were responsible for protecting the Party from its enemies‖ 
(Tanner 1999: 62). The system includes police, procuracy, court, lawyers, correctional 
services and, indirectly, People‘s Armed Police (PAP) which are broadly defined as 
political-legal apparatus (政法机关). Individuals working in those political-legal 
apparatuses are referred to as political-legal officers (政法干警). For the CCP, 
institutions and individuals within the political-legal system share a common political-
legal identity. While sub-division of responsibilities and separate professional 
characteristics are possible and even necessary, they are nevertheless secondary to, 
and submerged into, the defining political-legal identity. While recognizing the 
institutional specialty and professional expertise of courts and judges, the CCP never 
admits a judicial identity with a strong sense of professionalism and institutional 
autonomy. The court may have been allowed to manifest some institutional 
distinctions and procedural uniqueness, but it is defined principally by the common 
characteristic that it shares with other institutions in the same system, that is, a organ 
of people‘s dictatorship serving the CCP‘s interest.  
 
The Political-Legal Committee (PLC) (政法委员会) exercises the leadership role in 
the political-legal system. The PLC has grown into a gigantic organization within the 
CCP and exists at each level of the CCP Committee. The Central Political-Legal 
Committee (CPLC) (中央政法委员会) in Beijing is the headquarters of the political-
legal system. It has been a convention that the PLC chairman at a local level is a 
member of the Standing Committee of CCP Committee at the respective level.   
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The PLC has had a checked history which reflects the larger political development of 
the CCP. Its prototype was a Central Law Committee (中央法律委员会) which was 
set up in 1948 to prepare for the establishment of a new government, responsible for 
―legislative and legal issues‖ (Ye 2012). In 1949, the new government created a 
Political-Legal Committee under the State Council (政务院政治法律委员会) to 
advise the government on legislative and legal matters, with Dong Biwu (董必武), 
one of the vice Premiers, serving as the Chairman, Peng Zhen (彭真) as a deputy 
chairman, and Ren Jianxin(任建新) as a secretary (Ye 2012; Yu 2006). The 
Committee was created to manage the massive transition in the legal system and 
prepare for the establishment of new legal institutions. Once the new legal institutions 
were in operation, and especially after the promulgation of the Constitution and other 
laws in 1954, the Committee was regarded as having finishing the task it was set up 
for and was abolished (Ye 2012). Dong Biwu became the President of the Supreme 
People‘s Court (SPC) in October 1954.   
 
The predecessor of the current PLC was the Political-Legal Leadership Group (PLLG) 
(政法领导小组), which was created in 1958 as part of a larger effort to ―strengthen 
the unitary leadership of the CCP‖ and push back against the legalistic movement 
since 1954. It was set up directly under the Politburo to exercise oversight over all 
legal institutions (Li. M 2010). Peng Zhen was named the Head of the PLLG. Those 
were turbulent years in Chinese politics when legal institutions were virtually shut 
down and the CPLLG died a natural death. Political-legal leadership was taken over 
by men with an intelligence and security background, such as Kang Sheng (康生) and 
Wang Dongxing (汪东兴) (Tanner, 1999). It was not until 1978 when the PLLG was 
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brought back to life and then upgraded in January 1980 as the Political-Legal 
Committee. In a document circulated in 1980, the CCP Central Committee set up the 
CPLC with the terms of references of handling significant matters in the political-
legal sector. Peng Zhen, who was one of the Deputy Chairmen of the National 
People‘s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, became the CPLC Chairman . In 1982 
the CCP Central Committee issued the Directives on the strengthening of political-
legal work to clarify that the PLC was a ―working department‖ (工作部门) within a 
CCP committee and, for the first time, the terms ―liaise‖ (联系) and ―guide‖ (指导) 
are used in describing its relations with legal institutions. Its restoration in 1980 
coincides with a national effort to re-construct legal institutions and to develop a 
socialist rule of law.  
 
Guidance or otherwise, the PLC, once in place in the early 1980s, started to develop 
its own interest. In the process of providing the overall coordination among legal 
institutions, it set priorities for local institutions and gave instruction on case handling. 
In doing so, it came into direct conflict with legal institutions, the procuracy and the 
court in particular. In the late 1980s, the central leadership initiated a range of 
political reforms to enhance press freedom and judicial independence, with a focus on 
the separation of the CCP from the government. Under the leadership of Hu Yaobang 
and Zhao Zhiyang, the policy tilted significantly toward the autonomy of legal 
institutions, and the PLC was seen as an institutional barrier toward the development 
of rule of law in China. In 1987, the CCP made a decision to institutionalize the 
separation of the CCP from the state and in May 1988, the CCP abolished the CPLC 
but restored a down-scaled central political-legal leading group (Tanner 1999).  
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That was a short-lived reform and the CCP reversed its reform policies after the 1989 
students-led movement and the bloody crackdown in Tiananmen. Seeing the PLC 
system as a core component of the CCP‘s political control, the CCP restated the status 
of the CPLC in 1990, insisting in the Notice on Sustaining Social Stability and 
Strengthening Political and Legal Work that ―Political-legal organizations are an 
important component of the state machineries, an important tool of people‘s 
democratic dictatorship, and a knife in the hands of the CCP and the people‖ (Li. M 
2010: 43).  
 
The restoration of the PLC in March 1990 was followed by a significant expansion 
and diversification of the PLC‘s powers. In March 1991, another important 
organization, the Central Committee on the Comprehensive Treatment of Social 
Order (中央社会管理综合治理委员会) was set up to be in charge of public order. 
The Committee operates within, and effectively absorbed into, the PLC system.  That 
is the so-called ―heshu bangong‖ (合署办公). The political-legal system received a 
further momentum in 1995 when the CCP Central Committee enhanced the political 
status of PLC as a ―functioning department of the CCP Committee‖ and has the power 
to ―lead‖ political-legal works. With circulation of the 1991 Document, the PLC made 
the transition from an advisory body to a real power house (Yu 2006). The leadership 
role of the PLC over legal institutions was thus formally established. In 1999, the 
CCP issued another decision to solidify the leadership position of the PLC in the 
political-legal system.  
 
The role of the PLC in relation to legal institutions was contentious throughout the 
1990s, reflecting the leadership‘s ambiguous position on the role of law and CCP 
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control. CCP leaders were keenly aware of the potential danger of a powerful PLC 
and the damage that it could do to the Constitutional division of powers and the rule-
based governance that the CCP was promoting. Jiang Zemin, for example, was 
suspicious of a powerful PLC to intrude into legal institutions, warning the PLC 
cadres at the 1997 National Conference on Political and Legal Work that: ―those 
cadres who replace law with their words and interfere with the independence handing 
of cases by legal institutions … must be seriously investigated and punished 
according to the CCP rules and State law‖ (Jiang 1997). Jiang‘s insistence on socialist 
legality might have been a strategic move to undercut the power-base of Qiao Shi (乔
石), the Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee. Jiang didn‘t hesitate to use the 
CPLC to control the legal institutions when it was necessary. When Jiang ordered the 
persecution of Falun Gong (法轮功), in 1999, the whole political-legal establishment 
was mobilized to execute his plan (Peerenboom 2002).  
 
Jiang‘s emphasis on the socialist legality had its impact on the relations among CCP 
elites, the PLC, and legal institutions.  The CPLC was probably most ―liberal‖ under 
Jiang‘s leadership because of a unique balance of institutional powers. The CPLC did 
not have a high political profile during that period of time and the Chairman, Ren 
Jianxin, was not a Politburo member and did not hold significant political power. 
Significantly, he was the President of the SPC and indeed the only SPC President who 
headed the CPLC and outranked the contemporary Minister of Public Security. The 
Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of the political-legal system was 
Qiao Shi to whom the court and the entire political-legal system were accountable.       
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Under that particular political circumstance, the PLC exercised its leadership mainly 
at the policy level without meddling into the legal process and the particular case 
handling, as the CPLC Chairman Luo Gan (罗干) reiterated on many occasions (Ye 
2012). The whole system anchored its missions and objectives in a rule of law 
framework. Since the mid and late 1990s, the CPLC started to frame the political and 
legal work in relation to legal supervision and the primary function of the PLC was to 
supervise the implementation of law by legal institutions so as to ensure that laws 
were properly and effectively applied and enforced by legal institutions (Li. M 2010).  
 
In spite of Jiang Zeming‘s promotion of law-based governance, it was under his watch 
that the political-legal system gained the most significant institutional powers. In 
response to the perceived challenge posed by Falun Gong, the CCP set up a 
Leadership Group on Falun Gong and subsequently an Office on the Falun Gong 
Issue on 10 June 1999 (referred to as the ―610 Office‖ (610 办公室)).  In 2000, the 
State Council set up a more general Anti-Cult Offices to work jointly with the ―610 
Office‖. While anti-cult operation was carried out by the police, it was again absorbed 
into the PLC system, with the CPLC as the ultimate decision maker on anti-cult 
matters. Also in 2000, the CCP set up another leading group – the Central Leading 
Group on Maintaining Stability (中共中央维稳领导小组) and a corresponding 
Maintaining Stability Office (维稳办公室), which are in charge of the handing of 
social unrest and operate within the PLC framework (Feng 2011).   
 
The CPLC broke further grounds in expanding its authority in the Hu Jintao era. The 
appointment of Zhou Yongkang as the Minister of Public Security in the end of 2002 
was most crucial in explaining the rise of the PLC powers in China. Zhou Yongkang 
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proved to be an effective Minister in disciplining the police, improving their public 
image and enhancing their political standing in the political system (Fu 2005). One 
significant development during Zhou‘s tenure was the fact that local police chiefs 
joined the powerful standing committee of the respective local CCP Committee and 
also served as the PLC Chairman. The combination of three powerful positions in the 
hands of a single person created the superiority of police in the legal system. 
Apparently, Zhou Yongkang used the police power to challenge the CPLC headed by 
Luo Gan. Zhou created a police kingdom which was effectively outside Luo‘s control 
and then used the police to control the PLC outside Beijing.  
 
Once Zhou was promoted to the Standing Committee of the Politburo and became the 
CPLC Chairman, he developed a broader view beyond the police and became more 
focused on the power of the PLC itself. Under the pressure of other legal institutions, 
he first undercut police power within the PLC system by removing police chiefs from 
the PLC chairmanship, hence striking a power balance in the PLC system which 
allowed the courts and the procuracy to have more voices. But police remain powerful 
and, after leaving the PLC chairmanship, a police chief routinely holds position as 
deputy mayor/governor in the respective level of government, though the police 
power and influence lie outside the political-legal system.   
  
Zhou‘s legacy will be his willingness and ability to turn the legal system against law 
and create a culture of contempt of law within the political-legal system. Under his 
leadership, it becomes an accepted view that law can be qualified and tramped by 
CCP rules. He makes an implicit rule explicit that the CCP, not the law, is supreme. 
For the PLC, legal institutions may perform different functions according to their 
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respective division of labour, but CCP leadership is the underlying rule. As Zhou 
allegedly said at one of the CPLC meetings: The PLC‘s surname is CCP and nothing 
else really matters (Ye 2012).  
 
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PLC 
 
The PLC overseas a wide range of institutions and broad oversight responsibilities.  
The CPLC, for example, owes Legal Daily and controls China Law Society, and 
through which, the entire legal academy. The PLC‘s  role varies in different historical 
time, as mentioned above, but broadly speaking, its core functions includes legal 
policy making; coordination inter-institutional relations; and decision-making in 
individual cases.   
 
Legal Policies. The first role of the CPLC is the policy-making, which is defined as 
―assisting the CCP Central in formulating directives and policies on political-legal 
work‖ and ―planning the overall political-legal work within a certain period of time.‖ 
The PLC makes criminal policies and provides coordination among legal institutions 
in implementing the policies that it has made. Traditionally, it was crime, major ones 
in particular, that the PLC was concerned with. While the PLC has tried to expand to 
the areas of commercial and economic law during the past two decades, its focus 
however remains decisively within the traditional criminal justice matters.  
 
China now operates a dual criminal justice system: a routine, ordinary one which 
follows the legal rules and procedures with relative stability and predictability; and an 
ad hoc extraordinary one which relies on periodical campaigns against crimes. The 
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two systems adhere to different ideologies and have different institutional bases. The 
routine system, despite of its drawbacks and abuses, is characterized by increasing 
regularity,  professionalism and relative institutional autonomy, while the 
extraordinary system, driven by the PLC, is characterized by periodical external 
shocks into the normal criminal justice system. When the PLC intervenes in response 
to ad hoc political contingence, the criminal justice institutions lose their institutional 
autonomy: rules are suspended and professional identity is swept away. The 
institutional mandate gives way to political expediency, hence resulting in a political 
takeover of the criminal justice system (Trevaskes 2007).  
 
The PLC‘s grip on courts is limited because the court‘s jurisdiction goes far beyond 
crime. Indeed, the percentage of criminal cases in the overall caseload of Chinese 
courts has been declining steadily and now it only counts for less than 10 percent of 
the overall court cases. Criminal trial is no longer the court‘s central role as it used to 
be the case (Fu 2011a). The post-Mao economic reform has witnessed a surge of civil 
and commercial cases which occupy most of the court docket and over which the PLC 
does not have the necessary competence. The social and economic transition 
necessarily marginalizes the PLC.  
 
Even within the criminal justice system, the PLC‘s policy role is diminishing because 
of the de-politicization of crime and the increasing substantive and procedural 
regularity in the criminal process. The post-Mao reform has introduced a degree of 
certainty and regularity in the legal system. Consequently, crime is now defined 
largely as a violation of the criminal law and the court, by and large, is able to 
conduct criminal trials within the legal framework. The business of adjudication relies 
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on certainty, continuity and predictability, and the more stable the court is, the less 
room there is for the PLC to intervene.  
 
As mentioned above, the PLC‘s traditional policy tool in the criminal justice sector is 
the launching of periodical campaign against crimes. While there had been frequent 
ad hoc campaigns in the 1980s and early 1990s, since the middle of the 1990s, 
campaign has played only limited role in criminal justice in China. Over the decades, 
the politically-oriented criminal process is diluted and ad hoc campaigns against 
crimes have become smaller in scale, less aggressive in style and operate largely 
within the legal framework. Campaigns-driven criminal justice policy remains active, 
but its impact on the criminal justice institutions has been reduced. Courts in 
particular keep a degree of distance from the politics of crime, such as limiting the use 
of the death penalty, more rigorous requirement of evidence and prohibition of 
parading offenders, sentencing rallies and other shaming punishment. In their 
institutional and procedural design, the courts are able to factor-in, internalize and 
absorb the arbitrariness of the political process.  
 
Inter-institutional Relations. Coordination of inter-institutional relations is the 
second major role of the PLC. The inter-institutional relations in the criminal justice 
system are characterized by mutual support and mutual supervision. Significantly, the 
court is not supreme and does not have the final say in controversial matters. 
Consensus develops through negotiation and compromise between state institutions 
through joint conferences and issuing legal interpretations jointly. But when 
institutions fail to achieve a consensus, the matter cannot be resolved within the 
system and the PLC intervention becomes necessary.   
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There is usually little controversy at the policy level and irreconcilable disputes are 
more likely to occur on more technical issues that concern with institutional interests. 
One dramatic example is about the courtroom formalities after the amendment of the 
Criminal Procedural Law (CPL) in 1996. Upon the implementation of the revised 
CPL on 1 January 1997, the SPC and Supreme People‘s Procuratorate (SPP) 
disagreed on certain courtroom formalities, including whether the benches for the 
prosecutors and judges should be of the same height; whether prosecutors should rise 
when judges enter the courtroom; and whether prosecutors should leave the files and 
evidence behind for judges to study after the end of a trial. Practices varied widely 
from one place to another and the SPC and SPP could not reach an agreement. As a 
result, the matter was referred to the CPLC for a decision. The CPLC ruled that 
judicial bench should be higher and placed in the centre of the courtroom; no one 
would rise when judges enter the courtroom, and prosecutors should leave files 
behind for judges to study after completing a trial (Editorial, 1997).  
 
But increasingly disputes between legal institutions are caused by different 
interpretations of legal provisions, such as different understandings of the elements of 
a crime or the type of crime that a particular act may constitute. When the SPP and 
SPC find themselves in opposite position in legal disputes, they invite the Standing 
Committee of the NPC to intervene and to offer an authoritative decision through 
legislative interpretation. On legal interpretation, the NPC Standing Committee has 
become the ultimate authority and the rise of the NPC and its ability to bring the 
criminal justice system into the legislative system (which is outside the political-legal 
system) that poses the most significant limit on the PLC‘s coordination power.  
15 
 
 
With legal disputes going to the NPC Standing Committee, the SPC finds itself more 
accountable to the Congress than to the CPLC. Significantly, the court is principally a 
judicial organ and receives mandates from the Constitution and law as made by the 
congress. The court applies law through resolving disputes and that core judicial 
functions are now set in stone. The Chinese court system is stabilizing despite 
changes in political circumstances. There is little that can be done in term of further 
institutional reform which needs the CPLC endorsement. While the CPLC leads, its 
leadership is more issue-limited, and it is the NPC Standing Committee that has 
become the routine arbitrator of legal disputes through its legal interpretation power. 
The congress has emerged as an important institution in coordinating the inter-
institutional relations.  
 
Deciding Hard Cases. As a sub-category of inter-institutional coordination, 
coordination of individual cases is the most active and also controversial 
responsibility of the PLC. The PLC intervenes into individual cases in two broad 
circumstances. Firstly, it intervenes in cases with significant impact. No doubt, legal 
institutions continue to be subjected to political control in a variety of sensitive cases. 
When a real or perceived crisis emerges, the moment comes when the PLC, or the 
CCP Committee itself, decides on the individual case concerned. Judges, and for this 
matter, everybody else, acknowledge the political reality that the CCP tramps the law 
in special circumstances.   
 
Secondly, there is the traditional conflict resolution which takes place when different 
institutions have drastically different views on a criminal case and a persistent 
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disagreement invites the PLC‘s intervention. As mentioned above, China runs a legal 
system that is not court-centric and the judiciary does not contradict significantly 
decisions made by institutions in an earlier stage of the criminal process. It happens 
that most conflicts take place mainly between the police which investigate the case 
and the procuratorate which refuses to prosecute or an appellate court which refuses 
to approve a conviction. When the institutions disagree to a compromise, the case 
enters a stalemate and the suspect would linger in the process.  
 
When that happens, the case would be referred to the PLC for coordination. The PLC 
coordination is a dynamic process and the extent to which the PLC is able to persuade 
or force an institution to give in and reach a decision depends on the prevailing 
political atmosphere, the relative political status of the PLC Chairman and the 
bargaining power of the institutions involved in the dispute (Ying 2012). Case 
handing is often regarded as the most substantive power of the PLC at the local level. 
 
The recently exposed cases of wrongful conviction, such as the cases of She Xianglin 
(佘祥林) who was wrongfully convicted of murdering his wife in 1994 and the case 
of Zhao Zuohai (赵作海) who was also wrongly convicted of murdering his fellow 
villager in 2002, have shed some light on the lengthy process of the PLC coordination 
and the PLC strategies in bypassing legal rules in achieving convictions. They also 
place the PLC in the lime light of public outcry (Li. M 2010; Zeng and Shi 2012; Yan 
2010).  As the cases illustrated, the PLC intervention became necessary because the 
prosecution and the appellant court no longer took police investigation for granted and 
raised questions that the police could not answer and required evidence that the police 
could not provide.  Unfortunately, when conflicts happen and the PLC intervenes, it 
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would rule in favour of the police because of the political position and ideological 
orientation of the PLC and the knowledge base of the PLC Chairmen. Once the CCP 
has spoken, the legal institutions would give in to political pressure, give up their 
legal principles and dutifully prosecute and convict as instructed.    
 
Increasingly, there are more proactive interventions and the CPLC, in the name of 
maintaining stability, has become eager to use criminal punishment in achieving its 
policy goal, in particular against chronic petitioners. Under Zhou Yongkang‘s 
leadership, the whole PLC system has gained tremendous political power and the PLC 
at the local level is able to push those cases through the criminal justice system and 
secure criminal convictions over the objections of the prosecution and the courts 
(Shen 2010).  
 
The Structural Constraints on the PLC Powers. The political position of the PLC 
Chairman has evolved over the past decades and China has in the recent few years 
witnessed the concentration of political power at the PLC at every level. But the 
PLC‘s power is structured limited in a one Party system which strives for a degree of 
rule of law.  
 
First of all, while CCP leadership is absolute, the PLC‘s is not. At the central level, 
the Chairman of the CPLC has gathered significant political power when the office 
holder is elevated to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. But the political stature 
of the CPLC Chairman cannot be replicated at local levels where the political power 
of the PLC Chairman is more limited. Local CCP secretary tends to take a more 
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hands-on approach and would not allow the PLC Chairman to share significant 
political powers.  
 
While the PLC may lead, guide or coordinate political-legal work, it does not have 
control over the nomination, appointment or removal of leaders in legal institutions 
(Ye 2012). Personnel power firmly belongs to the Standing Committee of the CCP, 
administered by the Organization Department and placed under the tight control of, 
and jealously guarded by, the CCP Secretary. Nor does the PLC have any control over 
budget. That explains the fact that the PLC at local levels is a place ambitious 
politicians try to avoid, and consequently, it has become a place for retirement in the 
same way as the local people‘s congress does. 
 
Further, it is important to look at the PLC and the court not as a dyadic relationship 
but as a sub-set of a larger political network involving multiple organizations at 
different levels. Behind the PLC is the CCP Secretary where the real power lies, 
especially at the local level; and behind a legal institution, there is a corresponding 
superior organization on the vertical line. For important decisions, a legal institution 
may directly report to the CCP Secretary, leaving the PLC to implement a decision 
that has already been made. Alternatively, an institution may approach its own 
vertical line of authority for guidance, further undercutting the authority of the local 
PLC. Indeed, the PLC is actually sandwiched in between and does not have the 
necessary power to make important decisions.     
 
Finally, the PLC‘s power is mainly supervisory. The PLC is not part of the legal 
system and does not have its own institutional base. It cannot usurp the police or the 
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court and does not have the substantive powers to make a legally binding decision. It 
is a popular view among the PLCs that their power is secondary and derivative. 
According to that view, legal institutions under the PLC supervisions are real 
decision-makers with real power. As powerful as the PLC is, its power derives from 
the decisions made by other institutions. A PLC without an institutional anchor is 
necessarily weak in the Chinese political system.  
 
THE CCP, THE LAW AND THE JUDICIARY  
 
There has always been a reform tradition within the CCP in which a group of senior 
CCP members occupying legislative or legal positions advocate legal reforms. The 
reformist tradition shares many common characteristics. First, all legal reformers were 
dedicated and loyal Communists and wholeheartedly embraced the overall leadership 
role of the CCP in legal institutions. Their starting point in initiating legal reform was 
certain degree of functional separation of institutions and a more structured and self-
restrained political leadership that allowed a higher degree of autonomy in the 
operation of legal institutions. CCP leadership was internalized and exercised through 
a CCP group (党组) and CCP members within a legal institution. The reformers took 
state constitutional design seriously and advocated the exercise of political power 
within and through the constitutional structure instead of outside of it (Potter 2003). 
As Xiao Yang (肖扬) (2005) pointed out, the ruling Party must exercise its political 
power in according with the law. While the CCP leads the legislative, judicial and law 
enforcement bodies, it cannot replace them.  
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Second, reformers in that tradition promoted the rule of law. As Xiao Yang (2005) 
reiterated ―the CCP should act within the scope of the Constitution and the laws, not 
outside the Constitution and the laws. The CCP must not place itself above the 
Constitution and the laws.‖ However, legal reformers have advocated the rule of law 
with different motivations and objectives in response to the prevailing political 
circumstances. When Peng Zhen and his comrades carried out legislative and legal 
reform in the early 1980s, they intended to use law to constrain despotism within the 
CCP which was regarded as the root cause of the political chaos in the 1960s and 
1970s (Fu 2011b; Potter 2003). In that sense, rule of law was regarded as a catalyst to 
promote democratic values and an integral part of a concerted effort of political 
liberalization.   
 
After China initiated the market reform in the 1990s, the rule of law was revived to 
serve primarily the economic function. For ex-Premier Zhu Rongji, rule of law was an 
additional regulatory tool to facilitate his economic reform and reduce local resistance 
and distortion. It was commonly believed that a market economy required a sound 
legal framework to offer stability and predictability for market transactions. As noted 
by Ginsburg, law serves a market-enhancing function without posing a fundamental 
political challenge, that is, ―to help provide predictability in the economic sphere 
without hindering core regime policies or interfering in the political sphere‖ 
(Ginsburg 2008).  
 
Finally, reformers advocated the development of legal expertise and professionalism. 
Instead of the broad identity of political-legal officers, reformers nurture a creeping 
professional identity and pride for lawyers, prosecutors and judges. Institutional 
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innovations, such as the common judicial examination, have introduced a professional 
standard into the old political-legal world, and through which nurtured and developed 
a legal community with common identity, interest and mission. By nurturing a 
professional identity of legally-trained professionals, the reformers effectively divided 
the political system by separating the more repressive arm of the state (including the 
police, the PAP and the prisons officials) from the legal professionals. Reformers 
envisaged a stronger legislature, an institutionalized court and a more rule-based legal 
system.  
 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE COURTS 
 
The PLC does not settle disputes or try cases. The court does and it does so in 
according to a unique set of rules and procedures. It is this institutional distance that 
allows the court to develop a degree of autonomy and professionalism. . The best 
defense of judicial autonomy is legal rules and the application of those rules in 
concrete cases, as requested by litigants and their lawyers, which form the barbwires 
to keep the PLC at a distance. The court hears over 12 million cases in 2011 including 
over 840,000 criminal cases (Wang 2012). There are now near 200,000 judges 
working in 10,000 courts. Over the past three decades, the courts have developed a 
comprehensive, largely cohesive, stable and self-referencing body of judicial rules.  
 
Given the volume of the cases, a well-established judicial structure and a wide 
ranging judicial law making power (Ip 2011), it is the court, not any CCP organization, 
which has the power, interest and knowledge to try the vast number of cases. Firstly, 
the power lies with the court and under the law, only the judges have the power to 
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adjudicate and render legally authoritative decisions on disputed cases. The PLC and 
other authorities may give instructions and guidance, but only the court can rule. 
Secondly, judges also have the incentive to exercise the power in a way that is legally 
accountable and there is adequate accountability mechanism in place to ensure most 
of the judges comply with the legal requirement in most of the cases to avoid 
disciplinary actions (Minzner 2009). Finally, legal rules have been developing for 
three decades and there is a body of specialist knowledge and expertise which are 
indispensible in the adjudicative process. Lawyers, broadly defined to include people 
with specialist legal training and experiences, have become indispensible for court-
based dispute resolution. As long as the CCP maintains the course of building a 
socialist rule of law and a functional legal system, the judicial role is irreplaceable and 
the court has to be allowed to development its institutional capacity and professional 
standard to perform its functions. 
 
While Chinese courts have been developing professional capacity and institutional 
autonomy, the development also reflects the larger political and economic 
circumstances in which the court operates and the level of maturity of China‘s legal 
development. There will be abundance Chinese characteristics. 
 
One of the defining characteristics is the collective identity that a Chinese court will 
take. The Chinese court builds external autonomy by strengthening the internal 
bureaucratic structure at the cost of the discretion of individual judges and developing 
judicial legitimacy through enhanced internal judicial management. The court as a 
collective, not the judges as individuals, is the embodiment of judicial autonomy. One 
way to build judicial strength and autonomy in China is the creation of a collective 
23 
 
body in a court, the Adjudicative Committee (AC), to ensure internal bureaucratic 
control and fend off external interference. Doubtlessly, in major cases such as those 
involving political dissidence, major corruption, and other sensitive and high profile 
cases, the court remains deferent to the PLC. But in the vast majority of cases, the 
court has to make its own decisions and the court‘s answer to outside challenges is 
that it has the capacity to deliver quality judgment through rigorous internal control 
(Peerenboom 2007). The AC may not be able to give much guidance to judges and 
only rubber-stamp whatever trial judges recommend (He 2013), but as a symbol of 
collective decision and internal accountability, the AC has played an essential 
legitimacy role.    
 
Another important characteristic of an emerging judicial autonomy is the non-
confrontational approach that a court may take in asserting authority.  The cooperative 
ethos within the legal system and a politically weak court necessitates a consensual 
approach in which judicial authority is exerted through negotiation, compromise and 
subtle pressure. One of the key mechanisms of consensus building is to invite the 
procuracy to join judicial deliberation before the court announces a significant 
adverse decision against the procuracy (Opinions of SPC and SPC 2009). A not-guilty 
verdict, for example, is an open challenge to the prosecutorial and police authority 
and has been used with great caution to maintain inter-institutional comity. Armed 
with an enhanced legal requirement in the criminal process, judges are asserting their 
authorities through other means, notably informal negotiation though which judges 
compel prosecutors to back-off from weak cases with sufficient notice and respect (Fu 
2011a).  
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Political intervention is part of the judicial process and a reality that the court knows 
how to live with. But whether the level of judicial autonomy is to increase or to 
decrease depends on the ability of the court to pass two competence tests (Fu and 
Cullen 2012). The first one is a judicial effectiveness test. PLC intervention is more 
likely to occur when the court‘s effectiveness is in doubt. As it happens, a final legal 
decision does not bring an end to the dispute and parties, after going though the 
adjudicative process, continue to petition non-judicial organs. Petition has become the 
defining characteristics of the Chinese judicial landscape and to an embarrassment to 
courts, for a substantial part of the petitioners‘ cases are made against a court decision. 
The inability to bring a dispute to an effective end has been an on-going difficulty for 
courts, and is regarded as a judicial failure with significant political implications. 
Thus, when the formal judicial process is regarded to have failed to contain and result 
in social conflict, the PLC intervenes and pushes the court toward mediation and 
informal settlement (Fu and Cullen 2012; Minzner 2011).  
 
The second one is a judicial integrity test. Judicial autonomy is not possible if judges 
are perceived as biased or simply croaks. Corruption undermines well-designed 
reform programs, destroys confidence in the judicial process and invites political 
control. Judicial corruption is well exposed in China although there is no evidence to 
show corruption is worse in courts than other sectors (Li, L 2010). Because of the 
nature of judicial work and the large number of cases that come in and out of the 
courts, corruption is more visible in courts and attracts more political attention. The 
higher the perceived corruption in courts, the more intense will be the political control, 
and the less autonomous the court becomes.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The court is a marginal institution in China‘s political system and the CCP controls 
the judiciary effectively through the PLC. The Chinese Constitution does not admit 
the separation of powers doctrine and instead, it subjects the court to enhanced 
legislative scrutiny. Under these political circumstances, it is unlikely that China will 
develop a robust judiciary which will then play a meaningful role in limiting state 
power. In that sense, judiciary independence, however defined, is unlikely to grow 
robust in an authoritarian setting.    
 
But political control and a resulting judicial compliance and subservience are not the 
only story of the past 30 years in China. The political and economic changes in China 
have generated demands for the rule of law to supply political legitimacy, promote 
economic development and improve social governance. Within the CCP, there has 
been a reformist tradition which advocates a functional separation between the CCP 
and the legal institutions, an enhanced role of law and an expansive institutional 
autonomy of the courts. When the reformist tradition gains political strength and 
becomes influential, it brings about institutional innovations and creates more 
breathing space for the legal system to grow.  
 
The relationship between the CCP and the court is thus a dynamic one. While the 
CCP has the absolute power, it has to refrain itself from intruding into the daily 
operation of the court and leave judges alone to handle the business of judging.  The 
CCP has its own objectives and repeatedly reminds the court of keeping the CCP‘s 
interest the priority in adjudication, but judges have to follow legal rules, procedures 
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and their own professional standard in handling individual cases The PLC may 
narrow the application of legal rules and the court‘s jurisdiction by forcing judges to 
settle cases through court-mediation; reorient judges from legal procedures toward the 
substantive goals beyond those procedures; or render police-friendly decisions in 
controversial cases. But for the vast majority of cases, the CCP has to be content to 
leave adjudication to judges. 
 
For judges, a degree of judicial autonomy, narrowly defined, is consistent with the 
CCP leadership. After all, the vast majority of them are CCP members who take it for 
granted that the CCP leads. Judicial socialization has taught judges that the enemies of 
judicial autonomy are numerous, and the CCP may not be the worst one. On the 
contrary, autonomy can be achieved in the Chinese context only when there   is 
sufficient political support from the CCP and the CCP can rule in a way that can 
facilitate judicial professionalism and autonomy. But that would necessitate a 
limitation of the PLC powers on judicial operation and push the PLC back to its 
original advisory and policy role.  
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